‍Central Asia and The Caucasus Journal

Abstract With Putin's reelection on March 2018, a new era of relations started between Russia and the West. During the period of Putin's presence in the Kremlin, relations between West and Russia have experienced some periods of tension and peaceful concords. In early 1990s, there were prospects about Russia’s becoming a democratic state and becoming part of the normative framework of the West. After the end of the Cold War, Russia sought an equal status in international system and it also was against Western values and normative imposition. The main question of the article is "how the areas of disagreement between the Russian Federation and the West can be assessed?" The author believes that there has been a divergence between Russia and the West’s attitude towards the international system after the end of the Cold War. Russia tries to stabilize its position as a global power ​​and the rejects the existence of its specific spheres of influence that is claimed by the West.

Abstract Although the Ukrainian crisis was accompanied by tensions between Russia and the West and the imposition of mutual sanctions, demonstration of military power and diplomatic conflicts, it did not have a great impact on the Russian Federation's policies in the Arctic and its militarism in that region. At the same time, Moscow has managed to continue its cooperation in the Arctic despite current tensions with the West, and to extend its relations with other regional actors in a cooperative manner. The author attempts to find an answer for the following questions: a) Why Russia, in spite of its rivalry with the United States and the West, has not behaved contentiously in the arctic; b) why Ukraine's experience does not seem to happen in the Arctic? To answer the mentioned questions, the hypothesis has been tested through examining the two theoretical approaches of "complex interdependence" and "neo-realism" confirming that "the superiority of Russia's position in the Arctic and the lack of a serious threat to its interests in this area by the other powers has led Russia to play differently in the Arctic, in such a way that Moscow requires cooperation and, at least, avoids from tension in the region in order to gain its absolute interests. Therefore, the Ukrainian crisis has not had much influence on Moscow's understanding of the Arctic as an area of international cooperation and peace. The findings of this study, which are comparative and descriptive-analytical, confirm the validity of the research hypothesis.

Abstract Since the end of cold war neither the Great Britain nor Russia has ever prioritized one another; and therefore their mutual relationship has been mainly confined to the framework of European Union and NATO. This has happened irrespective of their common history, including both countries’ presence in Security Council, their actorness as great powers and coalition in some international crises including their cooperation in Napoleonian War and strategic cooperation in World War II. The Great Britain and Russia’s envision about each other is formed in a framework of rivalry and bellicosity. Brexit has also been one of the challenges in their relations; still their diplomatic relationship in at its lowest level since the end of cold war. The author attempts to answer the following question: How are the effective factors on Britain and Russia’s disagreement assessed? The author argues that their different prism for seeing the international order after cold war, Russia’s hybrid war in Great Britain and its attempt to manipulate in 2016 survey, Ukraine’s crisis and Crimea’s accession to Russia, the murder of some Russian citizens in Britain as well as their divergent approach towards the Syrian crisis, have all led to a threat perception from one another and a reduction in mutual relations. Using explanatory – analytical research method, the author attempts to find an answer for the article’s question.