‍Central Asia and The Caucasus Journal

Abstract The Ukraine crisis is one of the most prominent geopolitical developments in 21 century. It began with expansive attacks by Russia’s troops in Ukraine. This crisis led to a policy divide between Russia and west. This crisis also creates a new context for the boundaries of the new global order. In common situation, the position of China as the strategic ally of Russia is so prominent in order to end the war. This study investigates to answer this question: How China reacted to Russia-Ukraine war? The hypothesis of this study indicates that China has multifaceted approach according to a policy of ambiguity and duality about this war. This policy leads to maintaining and deepening the relationship with Russia and creating a balance against the West. Examining China’s approach about the Ukraine crisis is done in defensive realism theory. This study employs an analytical-explanatory framework. Further more the data collection method is qualitative, based on library sources and online resources. Then collected sources are analyzed by using the content analysis method. The findings of this study indicate that China uses the Ukraine crisis as the opportunity for challenging with the United States in Asia-Pacific and weakening the Western alliance. China also expanded its strategic partnership with Russia in the economic, energy, technology and security fields.

Abstract The Second Nagorno-Karabakh War marked a pivotal juncture, initiating a significant reconfiguration of the security order in the South Caucasus and redefining the roles of regional and extra-regional actors. Within this evolving landscape, the strategic latitude of regional players is increasingly influenced by shifting power dynamics and the competing interests of dominant states. Observable changes in traditional alignments—such as the apparent decline of Russia's influence over Armenia and the expanding strategic footprints of Turkey and Israel—underscore these transformations and heighten the potential for renewed conflict. Critical variables are now shaping the emerging order, including Armenia's foreign policy reorientation, the uncertain trajectory of Armenia-Azerbaijan peace negotiations, Georgia's geopolitical positioning, and the intensified contest over strategic corridors. These developments reflect the underlying dynamics of great power competition intersecting with local rivalries. The resulting complexity, characterized by a multitude of actors and intricate interdependencies, renders outcomes increasingly unpredictable and potentially challenges conventional analytical frameworks for understanding regional security transformations

Abstract The Belt and Road Initiative was launched in 2013 by Xi Jinping. This initiative is one of the important aspects of China's foreign policy. Due to the geographical extent, extensive infrastructural dimensions and subsequent developments of this project, different countries have studied and paid special attention to it at both academic and executive levels. The study of the relations between Russia and China has always been the focus of international relations experts. In this light, the Russian Federation has also considered the Belt-Road Initiative and has followed a certain pattern of behavior in relation to it. Therefore, understanding the behavior pattern and Moscow's approach to the Belt and Road Initiative will reveal important aspects of the dynamics of mutual relations between these two countries. The present study investigates and evaluates the approach of the Russian Federation towards China's Belt and Road Initiative in the light of the macro strategy in the period of 2013-2020. Therefore, the current research seeks to answer the main question, how can the behavioral pattern of the Russian Federation be explained towards China's Belt and Road initiative in the mentioned time frame? The findings of the article show that Russia considers the Belt-Road as a project aimed at increasing China's geopolitical influence at both the international level and the Central Asia region, and by following the model of competition and cooperation for this plan, it seeks to coordinate it with the Eurasian Economic Union and prevent more influence. It is from China in Central Asia.

Abstract Civil war in Syria and the interventions of regional and transregional players with their diverse and opposite motivations have led to different implications including the strengthening of Tafkirism and recruitment of extremist forces from different regions including Central Asia. Against this backdrop the authors try to find an answer for the following questions: What are the main reasons for the promoting of Takfirism from Syria Crisis to the Central Asia and how it impacts Russia’s interests in the region.
                        The authors argue that interventions of regional and transregional players including Russia has led to promotion of Takfirism to the Central Asia. The second argumentation of the research is that in its attempt to revive the superpower status, Russia considers Syria as its main battle ground against West. The return of Central Asian extremistsfrom Syria would also lead to security implications for the region.

Abstract A few years after the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union decided to set up Navy, the Caspian Sea is militarized growingly. In addition to the Russian Navy, which is the most powerful and experienced navy in the Sea, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Navies are also expected to be added to the chessboard. The main question of this article is that “what would be the possible impacts of militarization of the Caspian Sea on the Iranian national security?” The article’s hypothesis is that “the militarization of the Caspian Sea would enhance the national power of some coastal states and disturb balance of power in the region temporarily and therefore, would put real military, economic as well as political challenges before Iran.    

Abstract This article analyses the emergence of the Russo-Chinese cooperation within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the security implications for the Eurasian security landscape. By conducting a systematic and theoretically informed analysis the article contributes to the sofa  sparse body of literature on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. By employing a balance of power model we investigate to what extent the Russo-Chinese Shanghai Cooperation Organization has elements of so-called soft balancing against the United States in the post-cold War period. By doing so, we generate insights into the contemporary and intertwined academic debates on the durability of the American soft balancing. We reach the tentative conclusion that the Russo-Chinese dominated organization seems to be a reaction to advances in American power and influence generally, and on the Eurasian land-mass in particular but that soft balancing activities as such are so far modest. If  the organization progresses further to form a genuine counter-American block, the implications of the SCO-cooperation for European security could be profound. On the one hand the European major powers could benefit from the flexibility of having an alternative alignment option at its disposal. However, a new Russo-Chinese alliance could also produce a new hostile block on Europe’s Eastern flank detrimental to its security.