‍Central Asia and The Caucasus Journal

Abstract Russia's foreign policy has been significantly shaped by the concept of pragmatism throughout its history, particularly in recent decades. This article seeks to provide a clearer explanation of how this pragmatism can be analyzed in the conduct of Russian statesmen. The central question posed is: how does "Gorchakovism" demonstrate the dimensions of Russian pragmatism in historical and empirical contexts? The hypothesis advanced here is that the restoration of Russia's international status after its defeat in the Crimean War (1853–1857) and the Treaty of Paris, achieved through a step-by-step diplomatic approach and the effective utilization of opportunities within Europe's geopolitical environment, established Gorchakov as a historical emblem of Russian pragmatism. To examine this hypothesis, the authors employ the theory of pragmatism in foreign policy and a qualitative analysis of historical texts, political literature, and Russia's international developments. The primary finding of this article is that in the realm of international politics, national interests can only be effectively pursued through pragmatic, calculated, and incremental diplomacy. Furthermore, abstract ideals, unless they possess tangible applicability, risk leading nations and states toward collapse and failure.

Abstract American pragmatists consider the realist and liberal tradition in international relations to be inefficient and believe that most of the successes of American foreign policy have been achieved with a pragmatic approach and a peaceful method and emphasis on diplomacy. At first, Biden's foreign policy was organized around the issue of human rights and democracy, but the outbreak of the war between Russia and Ukraine caused a change in priorities. Therefore, by transitioning from liberalism to pragmatism in foreign policy, he tried to manage this crisis. The purpose of this article is to examine the change of priorities and approaches in Biden's foreign policy after the Russia-Ukraine war. The question of this article is: What did the Russia-Ukraine war cause? Has there been a change in the priorities of Biden's foreign policy? The hypothesis of this research, which tries to be proven with analytical and explanatory methodology and emphasis on objective and tangible political facts, is: that understanding the war between Russia and Ukraine as a strategic threat from the government Biden changed the approach in American foreign policy to manage this crisis. In such a way that pragmatism became the focal point and central core of Biden's foreign policy, and issues such as human rights and democracy are marginal issues.  

Abstract The Russian Federation in the post-Soviet era has faced with many security threats. This article has studied the approaches of the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin seeks to answer the fundamental question, " Why has Russia put realistic pragmatism and foreign policy codes on its foreign policy agenda under Putin?" The paper's hypothesis is that "the geopolitical threats and consequently the fragility of the Russian Federation's national security in the post-Cold War space have been the most important driver of pragmatism in its foreign policy". security threats at both domestic and foreign levels seem to undermine Russian security at three levels: domestic, regional and systemic. This has prompted Putin whit comprehensive approach to concept of security, to turn to Realistic pragmatism foreign policy to counter these threats. Research findings show that behavioral codes such as selective engagement, Emphasis on the formation of a multipolar system in the international system and the strengthening of regionalization, the strategy of reviving its power as a global power, economization of foreign policy, Russian-oriented institutionalism in Eurasia, The policy of looking to the East and cooperating with independent governments from the West and counter-terrorism which all have been designed and implemented to safeguard Russia's interests and security and reduce the potential impact of these threats on Russian national security. In this paper, the research method is in the form of formative and analytical explanations and attempts to find the root of the relationship between the dependent and independent variables of the article.

Abstract Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is one of the main regional institutions in which Iran may utilize, with its effective presence in it, from its instrumental and rightfulness capacities to increase its interests. Despite the micro interests, one of the macro advantages of effective membership in the organization is the relative participation in regulating the border arrangements of the country's north. In spite of these clear advantages, existing trends indicate that Tehran doesn't an effective role in it. Among various factors, applying single way approach rather pragmatic one and its reliance on "prior assumptions" such as substantive opposition of the SCO to the West, "assumptions" of perpetual "hostility" between Moscow and Washington and considering Russia as a "strategic partner" for Iran are of main reasons in this failure. With the help of "friends" in the organization, as a consequent, Iran has been seeking a counter front against the West. Contrary, relying on the principle of "pragmatism" in its foreign policy, Russia has always been simply considering SCO and its members as a means for securing its own “real” interests. Comparing Tehran with Moscow’s approach toward SCO with a descriptive explanatory method, the article is to analyze the cause of Iran’s failure in its presence.

Abstract Sorrow resulting from the loss of Tsarist and Soviet greatness can be one of few sharing points among active spectra in the socio-political trends of the post Soviet Russia. The feeling noticeable in the ideal form of transforming Russia into a "great power" is based on a variety of material and spiritual elements of Russia's past, present and future and is a considerable factor for creating domestic cohesion in its society of unbridled identity. The thinking is also influenced by Russian elite and people belief of Westphalian nature of international system as an independent and distinct identity too. Efforts in 1990s to achieve this ideal failed due to the lack of necessary resources and ideological approaches, nevertheless, adopting a pragmatic one Putin and Medvedev were relatively successful in realizing some "hard" aspects of this purpose. However, a mere looking "from above", disregarding factors of soft power and the continuing echo of traditional approach to some areas, including near-abroad were main causes of not fully realization of this idea.