‍Central Asia and The Caucasus Journal

Abstract The New Silk Road as the most ambitious macro-project in the current time is the sign and symbol of China’s power projection beyond its borders. Two lanes of the six lanes of the land belt of the New Silk Road go through the Russian territory. Also, Europe will be the main terminal of the land and sea routes of this grand project. Furthermore, China’s relations with Russia and Europe will involve potential tensions with huge consequences for the balance of power and global economy. From this perspective, the main issue is some sort of divergence and convergence of these three big powers along the Silk Road’s Eurasian land route. What are the divergence and convergence factors in China’s relations with Russia and Europe along the New Silk Road? The thesis is premised on the fact that the Polar Silk Road lays the ground for convergence, and the one going through Central Asia diverges Moscow and Beijing, and on the other side, China’s projects in the Balkans cause convergence in East Europe, while bringing divergence of relations with Central and Western Europe powers. This writing shows in detail the branches and the consequences of the Icy (Polar) Silk Road. Also, it enumerates the challenges and opportunities between China and Russia, especially in Central Asia; then, it shows China’s policy-line for infiltrating into East Europe and the Balkans. The paper explores the extent and expanse of China’s tense relations with West Europe countries. The theoretical framework of the paper is progressive based on a tri-faceted and tri-spherical reading of geopolitics. Such a framework of connection of these three structures with geographical factors shows that the roots and consequences of this macro-project can be traced back to the spheres of Geopolitics, Geo-culture,   and Geo-economy as well as to the three “International”, “Regional”, and “Internal” levels. 

Abstract The logic governing the International System is obtaining and upgrading power. Since science and technology are the prime source of power in the modern world, the countries are scrambling to obtain them within a context of competition and cooperation on various dimensions. Artificial intelligence is one of those advanced technologies which Russia pursues to develop and apply in various areas to boost its status in the international system. The question of the present paper is that within its strategy of Artificial Intelligence what goals does Russia pursue, and what challenges lie ahead of this path? The findings of the research show that Russia is seeking to get superiority in artificial intelligence and apply this technology to strengthen its military might and tip the power equations in its own favour  in the international system. Limited national economic capacities, lack of necessary scientific resources and infrastructures, technical and organizational problems, cooperation restrictions and international sanctions are among the challenges Russia faces in advancing its goals. The research method is a type of case-study with qualitative and essentially explanatory data.

Abstract The Syria crisis is a complicated crisis of the 21^st century, which due to the presence of the regional and trans-regional players has taken global dimensions, and despite bringing up various peace processes, the crisis is yet to be completely settled. Alongside the Geneva and Vienna Peace Talks, also the Russian government has kicked off the Astana-Sochi Talks with Iran and Turkey since 2017 to find a more pragmatic way to further the Peace process. The paper ahead is focused on the question how Russia has walked towards settling the Syrian crisis using the Astana-Sochi Talks and what are this country’s foreign policy goals for planning these talks? The authors believes that the Russian government has taken the initiative in these talks and by political and military settlement of the crisis, on one side, and prevention of the US and its regional allies from interference, on the  other side, it has resorted to these peace processes. The research examines this using the analytical-descriptive method.

Abstract Culture and cultural elements are important variables of international relations and contemporary scholars have emphasized the role of cultural issues in politics. Cultural diplomacy is an outstanding example of the soft power to pave the way for influence in others through culture, values, and ideas. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s relations with the Russian Federation have seen considerable expansion in many areas in recent years. Although the scale of relations is more evident in some areas as politics, security, and even economy, the growing trend in the cultural, social and human areas can also be seen. In present article, while reviewing Iran’s cultural activities in Russia, Iranian cultural diplomacy approach is studied. The authors will try to answer the question which elements of soft power are more applied in Iran’s cultural relation with Russia. In doing so, by looking into the major activities carried out by the Iranian cultural counselors and other cultural foundations in Russia, their roles in expanding cultural relations of two countries are assessed. The research method of this paper is qualitative analysis of content within the theoretical framework of the theory of soft power and cultural diplomacy.

Abstract The 2014 Ukraine crisis which started by Russia pressuring Ukraine not to join the free trade agreement with the EU and ultimately led to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian Federation, flamed the tension between Russia and the West. The implications of the annexation and the mutual sanctions by Russia and the West resulted in downgrading relations to the lowest level in last 25 years. This situation conjured up the Cold War conflicts and rivalries. The main goal of this paper is to answer the question what are the consequences of annexation of Crimea by Russia and the subsequent sanctions for the actors involved in the 2014 Ukrainian crisis? The findings of the present article utilizing international political economy show that the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the following sanctions have had a host of negative consequences for Ukraine, Russia, the EU, the US, and the NATO in various dimensions.

Abstract       Continuous monitoring of the daily lives of citizens is one of the fundamental propositions of bio-theory. On a broader scale, continued security controls and strict oversight over neighboring countries are also enforced by countries that have some form of historical-civilization conflict with their neighbors. Russia, as one of the historical and political axes of Central Asia, has adopted different foreign policies than what is called the near abroad. However, the fundamental element that is most prominent in Russian foreign policy in its peripheral environment seems to be its overarching security approach and its imposition of regional hegemony. In this regard, the present study has investigated the foreign policy of Russia in the South Caucasus by using descriptive-analytical method and by using the theories of bio-political theory. The results show that Russian foreign policy lacks hegemonic burdens despite multiple layers of persistent flexibility. This lack is due to divergent histories, cultures and ideologies that exist in the region, and Russia has always tried to suppress them by maintaining its superior military doctrine. Russia's military doctrine, however, has been able to maintain its hardware hegemony over the South Caucasus, and the three countries Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia inevitably pursue a policy of alignment and alignment with Russia because of structural deficiencies.

Abstract Although after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and its weakening in the international arena, relations between Russia and the West did not face much tension, and even cooperation between the two sides was established, gradually, and especially when Putin took office, Russian-Western relations have been strained. The turning point in changing Russians' view on the West was in 2004, when a series of color revolutions took place in the former Soviet republics. To Moscow, color revolutions were carried out with the help of the West or the US with the aim of creating a color revolution in Russia itself. For the Russian ruling elites, these actions marked the end of the cooperation between the mainstream politicians in the West and Russia, and an important moment in turning Russia's look away from the West and intensifying anti-Western sentiment in Russia. Since then, Russia sought to cement its position in the international system and weaken Western structures, especially the EU. To strengthen its influence in Europe, Moscow uses various tools to weaken the EU. In recent years, Russia has managed to promote Russophilia and Euroscepticism, that are two sides of the same coin. Russia's policy is attractive to parties and countries which see themselves as victims of the European Union. Russia hopes that the rise of right-wing parties in European countries will weaken liberal democracy structures. In recent years, challenging the security structures in the West and undermining the cohesion of the EU, have been the central goal of Russia's foreign policy. The main question is that "what are the main aims of Russia in strengthening its relations with European far right parties?" The hypothesis is that "Russia's main foreign policy is to challenge the Western security structures and Moscow hopes the rise of right-wing parties in European countries will undermine the Western liberal narrative and weaken the liberal democracy structure especially the EUs’". Using explanatory- analytical research method, the author attempts to find an answer to the article's question.

Abstract The Islamic Republic of Iran has, since the 2000s, stressed an eastward policy and the relations with Russia have been a major part of this policy, and this issue, especially in the years 2005 to 2014, has been more seriously pursued in the stated and practical policies. But the main matter in these relations is that, despite an eastward look in the Iranian foreign policy during those years, in practice the political ties were limited during that era followed by reduction of economic exchanges, and in this regard, the impact of the international sanctions, the sanctions approved by the UNSC which were supported by western and eastern countries, has been of great importance, and therefore, this question arises that how far and to what extent have the international sanctions impacted the reduction of Tehran-Moscow relations in the era of eastward policy? The pivotal idea of this paper is that “ the reduction of the two countries’ relations is more influenced by the international sanctions and these sanctions, due to Russia’s compliance with the international normative and security regimes resulted from international agreements and Russia’s approval of the UNSC resolutions  in sanctioning Iran, on one side, and the binding nature of these sanctions, on the other side, have severely reduced the relations of the two sides and made Iran’s eastward policy faced with challenges.” In this paper, for showing the relation of sanctions to the two countries’ ties, the method of codependence of variables has been used and for analyzing the reasons why Russia joined the sanctions resolutions of the UN against Iran, the method of Qualitative Analysis of the existing data in libraries, websites, and the views of some experts has been employed.

Abstract The European Union’s joint security and foreign policy towards Russia has gone through numerous unwanted ups and downs after the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially over the last two decades, due to various reasons although during the post-collapse conditions hopes for integration of Russia with Europe had been strengthened. Some causal premises are more important in this regard such as complexity of relations from a historical standpoint, the impact of contradictory norm-value sources on the EU’s decision-making  towards Russia, lack of sanctions  of the enactments of the EU in the security and foreign policy area, priority of a national policy  and lack of consistency among the members in implementing the decisions, conflicting multifaceted political, military and security conditions and in the end, mutual dependence, especially in the energy sector. Considering the above-mentioned concepts, the question of this paper is that “why the European Union’s joint security and foreign policy towards Russia has had serious changes and vacillations  after 2000?” the primary response is that the European Union’s joint security and foreign policy has been, on one hand, under pressure from geo-political considerations and energy security for cooperation with Russia, on the other hand, has been under the impact of practical inconsistency in this sector among the EU members and necessity of adopting  a confrontational policy against the Russian dominance to remove the regional worries, and this has made the European Union’s joint security and foreign policy towards Russia vacillate. The method used in this paper is of Analytical-Qualitative type.

Abstract Since the independence of the three South Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan Republic and Georgia) in 1991, the Islamic Republic of Iran has tried to have constructive relations with the mentioned countries in various fields by adopting a balanced policy. From Iran's perspective, the importance of the South Caucasus, in addition to its historical and cultural commonalities, lies in its neighborhood status and high potential for economic cooperation. However, due to the impact of technical and geopolitical factors, the economic relations between Iran and these countries, despite their great potential and advantages, have never reached its desired point. Although, US and UN sanctions against Iran have been a major obstacle to expanding Iran's economic cooperation with its neighbors, at the same time Russia's move to impose some restrictions on regional rivals, especially in the energy sector, and its impact on Iran's economic cooperation with the South Caucasus cannot be ignored. With the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2014 and escalating tensions with Europe and the United States that led to widespread sanctions against Russia, Moscow has turned its attention to cooperation with Eurasia and its neighbors.On the other hand, Iran's nuclear deal with the P5 + 1 in 2015 and the lifting of UN sanctions paved the way for improving cooperation between Iran and its neighbors, including Russia and the South Caucasus.
Accordingly, given the variable of Russia as the most important player in the South Caucasus, the authors seek to answer the following questions: Has the change in Russia's approach to regional cooperation with neighbors since 2014 affected Iran's economic relations with the South Caucasus? And if so, what was the effect? The authors argue that,Russia has played a positive role in strengthening Iran's economic cooperation with the three countries of the South Caucasus. Using the explanatory and analytical method, the developments in the relations between Iran and the countries of the South Caucasus from 2014 to 2019 are examined according to the Russian factor.
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Abstract Civil war in Syria and the interventions of regional and transregional players with their diverse and opposite motivations have led to different implications including the strengthening of Tafkirism and recruitment of extremist forces from different regions including Central Asia. Against this backdrop the authors try to find an answer for the following questions: What are the main reasons for the promoting of Takfirism from Syria Crisis to the Central Asia and how it impacts Russia’s interests in the region.
                        The authors argue that interventions of regional and transregional players including Russia has led to promotion of Takfirism to the Central Asia. The second argumentation of the research is that in its attempt to revive the superpower status, Russia considers Syria as its main battle ground against West. The return of Central Asian extremistsfrom Syria would also lead to security implications for the region.

Abstract After the collapse of the USSR and the development of new Russia, the areas that impacted directly on Russia’s security, came into a higher significance. The dominance of geopolitical discourse in Russia and a reliance on historical visions made the near abroad doctrine a priority in Russia’s foreign policy. Russia’s new security strategy also shifted from a global strategy with restrictive approach to a regional one applying an unrestrictive approach. In order to secure its security in the new era, Russia has defined three security circles which respectively are a) Russia; b) Russian Federation (Russia plus the autonomous but dependent Republics); c) near abroad (Central Asia). The present paper tries assess the role and nature of Russian – oriented institutionalism in its policy makings in Central Asia, using Volker Rittberger’s theory. The authors argue that the three cognitive, hegemonic and question oriented factors of the mentioned theory are all applied in Russian institutionalism in Central Asia, each with a different weight and effectiveness. In other words, Russia had mostly been focused on the latter two. Using explanatory - analytical methodology and library resources, the authors try to tell why the research findings provide an answer for the mentioned question.

Abstract It is more than a decade that the concept of “smart power” had entered the realm of political and international studies. It firstly initiated in the political and diplomatic circles of the United States and later on entered the political agenda of other power such as Russia, due to its thorough content. The mentioned concept reflects the evolution of power relations in a global level. The present paper tries to find an answer for the following question: Is Russia’s attempt for using smart power compatible for securing its foreign policy priorities and goals? The author argues that according to the complex nature (soft power and hard power) of smart power model, Russia’s reliance on smart power is based on hard power. The research findings show that using environmental smartness, rapid reaction, rational flexibility, as well as using power resources for growth process continuity, have been the most eminent existing features in Russia’s smart power strategy from 2014 to 2019.

Abstract The independence of the Central Asian and South Caucasus republics in the early 1990s and the establishment of new states along the Caspian Sea inevitably affected the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which had been formed incompletely by previous treaties, and the unilateral actions of the Caspian Sea littoral states in the field of exploitation of the sea's energy resources and the signing of oil and gas contracts with large Western companies had caused disagreements and ambiguities about the legal regime of the sea and the exploitation of undersea resources. The influx of Western oil and gas companies to exploit the black gold in the Caspian Sea, along with the difficulties of not determining the legal regime of the Caspian Sea, further widened the differences between the littoral states and prolonged the negotiation process to reach a comprehensive agreement. The signing of the "Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea" as an important achievement, while resolving many ambiguities and disagreements on the issues regarding the Caspian Sea, will determine the general framework of cooperation among littoral states and will turn the Caspian Sea into another pole of regional cooperation. This article has been compiled with the aim of exploring the causes and areas of cooperation among littoral states in the light of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea and seeks to provide an appropriate answer for the following question; "how the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea could affect and improve cooperation among littoral states?" The article hypothesizes that by removing many ambiguities about the legal regime of the Caspian Sea, the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, creates new opportunities for cooperation among littoral states. The present article is of qualitative (descriptive-analytical) type and using methodology (inductive-inferential), the data have been analyzed by library study and documentary analysis.

Abstract After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, as its successor, gradually began to redefine and reinterpret its identity, national interests and threats to its national security. Meanwhile, relations with the West have always been important to Russia and considered as a challenge in its foreign policy. For nearly three decades, the leaders of the Russian Federation have published a number of strategic documents to represent their identity in the post-Soviet space and to define the roadmap for the country's domestic, foreign, security and military policies. The main question of the article is "What is the position of identity in shaping the security view of the Russian Federation towards the West in post-Cold War era?"In order to find the answer to this question, by using the concept of identity in constructivism theory as well as analyzing the strategic documents published in this country, an attempt has been made to identify and highlight salient and sediment roles –identity of the Russian Federation and determine their role and position in shaping the Russian security view. The main hypothesis of this article is that " role - identities such as being considered as a great world power, a benign hegemon for near abroad countries of Russia (republics segregated from the Soviet Union) and a supporter of Russian-speaking people have had a significant impact on the nature of Russia's security view toward the West and has led to the formation of a threat-oriented view of the West. The present article is based on descriptive-explanatory methodology, and documents and cyberspace resources have been used for the research.
 

Abstract Despite economic entanglements and numerous international disputes, Russia has not abandoned its goal of creating a strategic deterrence against the United States over the past decade. As the result of its efforts, Russia today has access to ultra-supersonic advanced strategic weapons and projectiles that distinguish it from other nuclear powers worldwide. The objectives pursued by this paper are to examine the dimensions and characteristics of Russia's new nuclear deterrence strategy, the reasons for adopted this strategy and its consequences for Russia's relations with Europe and the United States. Accordingly, the present paper seeks to provide appropriate answers for the following questions: "What is the most prominent feature of Russia's new nuclear deterrence strategy?” and “What are its implications for the troika of Russia-EU-US relations?" The author argues that "The ability to pose a direct threat to the United States, rather than a proxy threat to Europe, is the most prominent feature of Russia's new nuclear deterrence strategy that may lead to the proximity of Russia to the European Union and deepening the rift on both sides of the Atlantic. A qualitative method and descriptive-explanatory methodology is employed in this paper and its theoretical foundation is laid on the deterrence (nuclear) theory. 

Abstract The growing strength of the BRICS countries over the past decades and the formation of this group in the last ten years, given the strategic, political and economic capabilities of this group, has seriously raised the possibility of changing the structure of the international system. In the meantime, the study of Russia's goals in the formation of this group and the process of its development during the years of BRICS formation is of special interest due to its key role in the establishment of BRICS and its relationship with the current international system.
The main question of the article is whether the BRICS influence on the international system is pursued with the aim of changing the existing order? In answer to this question, the hypothesis of the article is that the BRICS group is aimed at moderating the existing order by synergizing among its members and influencing the current power structure in the international system. The findings of the article show that the outcome of the BRICS goals is in line with the goals of Russia as one of the main BRICS members, despite the differences between this country and other members, in order to achieve the multiplicity of multiple centers of power worldwide. The method used is descriptive-analytical.

Abstract To understand why and how Moscow's internet capabilities are being used to defend against Western attacks, the present paper attempts to answer the following questions: Why Russia resorts to cyber weapons against Western targets? What are the characteristics of Russia's cyber war against the West and how is it pursued?
     This study is qualitative (descriptive-analytical) and is of Ex-Post Facto (causal) research category. An Inferential methodology has been utilized to analyze data in the context of the concepts of cyber warfare and political cyber-attacks. The Findings show that Moscow uses cyber weapons against Western targets to counter the West's hostile actions, especially in post-communist territories, considering high denial possibility and weakness of its kinetic components.  The most important feature of Russia's cyber war against the West is the development of the concept of cyber deterrence in this country to create a balance under the condition of normal military and political competition. On this basis, Russia's hybrid war against the West is mainly waged through distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, hacking, and utilizing malware.

Abstract Over the past few years, various viewpoints have beenproposed about the Islamic Republic of Iran’s economic development through its convergence with the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Some scholars argue that the necessity of Iran’s economic developments by means of regional economic convergence should put the EEU’s records of cultural relations and its member states’ geopolitical importance at the focal point of Iran’s economic foreign policy consideration. Others believe that converging with the EEU could pose some challenges to Iran and pave the way for Russia’s expansionist policies resulting in its greater political and economic influence in the region that will entangle Iran in a geopolitical rivalry. This study attempts to analyze the economic opportunities of the Islamic Republic of Iran resulting from its convergence with the EEU to answer for the following question: What economic opportunities will the integration of the Islamic Republic of Iran with the EEU create? The author argues that the mentioned convergence will reduce the impact of western sanctions and prepare the ground for Iran’s and its neighbors’ economic development as well as their foreign trade expansion.

Abstract Although there are currently no indications of conflict in the Arctic, Moscow's attempts to strengthen its assets and military positions in the region have been interpreted largely as militarism by Western media and political think tanks. However, all Russian strategic documents emphasize on Russia's economic profits being gained through the resources and routes of the Arctic and do not refer to any particular military threat in the region. This literature is to assess the nature of Moscow’s military presence and expansion in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, in order to discover its relation with two concepts of military modernization and militarism. Therefore, the author tries to find out the nature of the presence and expansion of Russian military capabilities in the Arctic over the past decade has mainly been based on military modernization or militarism, and its reasons. The basic findings prove that the nature of the presence and expansion of Russian military capabilities in the Arctic over the past decade have been due to Moscow's strategic goals (including defending its sovereignty in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation against NATO, supporting economic interests and shipbuilding and benefiting them, and formalizing the role of Russia as a major power); based on military modernization and not militarism. Using descriptive-analytical method and relying on a defensive-invasive dualism under the theoretical approach of neo-realization, the author tries to tell why the research findings provide an answer to the research question.

Abstract With Putin's reelection on March 2018, a new era of relations started between Russia and the West. During the period of Putin's presence in the Kremlin, relations between West and Russia have experienced some periods of tension and peaceful concords. In early 1990s, there were prospects about Russia’s becoming a democratic state and becoming part of the normative framework of the West. After the end of the Cold War, Russia sought an equal status in international system and it also was against Western values and normative imposition. The main question of the article is "how the areas of disagreement between the Russian Federation and the West can be assessed?" The author believes that there has been a divergence between Russia and the West’s attitude towards the international system after the end of the Cold War. Russia tries to stabilize its position as a global power ​​and the rejects the existence of its specific spheres of influence that is claimed by the West.

Abstract The perspective of integration and deepening cooperation among SCO members within last two decades, especially after its recent geographical extension towards South Asia, is faced with serious questions. The most long lasting bilateral disagreement in SCO is the issue about Kashmir between India and Pakistan. A divergence of Beijing and Moscow’s perception about international system and their different expectations from SCO – besides some other factors) also has led to disintegration in Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The present article tries to find an answer for the following question: what are the main internal rivalries in SCO and how will they affect its consistency and future? The author addresses the hypothesis that “the rivalry between China and Russia for determining SCO’s approach and outlines as well as the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan are the SCO’s main challenges. The former through scattering SCO’s priorities and the latter one through weakening security and defensive relations among the members prevents the Shanghai Cooperation Organization from its future integration and improvement”.

Abstract The establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union strengthened Russia's position in bilateral relations towards other members of the union, although the multilateral relations between post-communist countries remained without progress. Establishing Eurasian Economic Union to some extent also has fulfilled the geopolitical ambitions of Moscow, but the determination of the geopolitical agenda for this union by Moscow, despite the presence of members with the primary objective of economic interests, will not be easy. This is despite the fact that Russia has incurred considerable costs to establish this union and has pursued the policy of "luring by subsidizing". The main question of this article is "what does Russian expect to gain through in vesting on the establishment and expansion of the Eurasian Economic Union, considering the fact bilateral agreements with post-Soviet governments provides this country with more economic benefits?” The hypothesis tested under the framework of the new regionalism theory is: "although Russia's primary goal by establishing and expanding the Eurasian Economic Union is to strengthen a geopolitical deploy against the West at the borders of the European Union at the expense of exorbitant costs in order to keep these countries away from the west, it has not over looked the benefits of a long term economic, social and cultural cohesion of this union in the post-Soviet space". The study is descriptive-analytical and methodology applied to analyze the collected data is causal.

Abstract The “soft power” as an important concept was firstly entered to the political discourse of Vladimir Putin in February 2012; This concept, which is now of great concern for Kremlin, is derived from diverse and somehow contradictory resources with mostly governmental and formal natures. While focusing on Russia’s soft power towards its near abroad, using Nye’s conceptual framework, the present literature tries to study Kremlin’s goals of developing soft power and its soft power resources and instruments towards near abroad. Through studying Russia’s soft power resources in culture, economics and politics, the authors conclude that Russia’s political values are traceable in all the three mentioned areas. In fact, the purpose of this paper is to answer the following questions: what are the resources and instruments for Russia’s soft power that have empowered Russia regionally? And what are the constraints for Russian soft power in the region? The proposed hypothesis is that Russia's soft power in near abroad encompasses Russian language, culture, media, Orthodox Church, Russian compatriots as well as trade diplomacy. But instrumental look at soft power resources in this strategic region, as well as ineffectiveness, have weakened Russia's desirable convergence in near abroad. Using descriptive-analytical method, and based library and internet resources, the authors try to find an answer for the research question.

Abstract Although the Ukrainian crisis was accompanied by tensions between Russia and the West and the imposition of mutual sanctions, demonstration of military power and diplomatic conflicts, it did not have a great impact on the Russian Federation's policies in the Arctic and its militarism in that region. At the same time, Moscow has managed to continue its cooperation in the Arctic despite current tensions with the West, and to extend its relations with other regional actors in a cooperative manner. The author attempts to find an answer for the following questions: a) Why Russia, in spite of its rivalry with the United States and the West, has not behaved contentiously in the arctic; b) why Ukraine's experience does not seem to happen in the Arctic? To answer the mentioned questions, the hypothesis has been tested through examining the two theoretical approaches of "complex interdependence" and "neo-realism" confirming that "the superiority of Russia's position in the Arctic and the lack of a serious threat to its interests in this area by the other powers has led Russia to play differently in the Arctic, in such a way that Moscow requires cooperation and, at least, avoids from tension in the region in order to gain its absolute interests. Therefore, the Ukrainian crisis has not had much influence on Moscow's understanding of the Arctic as an area of international cooperation and peace. The findings of this study, which are comparative and descriptive-analytical, confirm the validity of the research hypothesis.