‍Central Asia and The Caucasus Journal

Abstract The Ukraine crisis is one of the most prominent geopolitical developments in 21 century. It began with expansive attacks by Russia’s troops in Ukraine. This crisis led to a policy divide between Russia and west. This crisis also creates a new context for the boundaries of the new global order. In common situation, the position of China as the strategic ally of Russia is so prominent in order to end the war. This study investigates to answer this question: How China reacted to Russia-Ukraine war? The hypothesis of this study indicates that China has multifaceted approach according to a policy of ambiguity and duality about this war. This policy leads to maintaining and deepening the relationship with Russia and creating a balance against the West. Examining China’s approach about the Ukraine crisis is done in defensive realism theory. This study employs an analytical-explanatory framework. Further more the data collection method is qualitative, based on library sources and online resources. Then collected sources are analyzed by using the content analysis method. The findings of this study indicate that China uses the Ukraine crisis as the opportunity for challenging with the United States in Asia-Pacific and weakening the Western alliance. China also expanded its strategic partnership with Russia in the economic, energy, technology and security fields.

Abstract Russia's military attack on Ukraine and the annexation of the four regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia to the Russian Federation is considered the largest military conflict in Europe after World War II, which explains why the military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine and the annexation of these regions to the Federation makes it necessary. Therefore, the main purpose of this article is to answer the questions that firstly, why Russia decided to attack Ukraine and annexed Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhia to the Russian Federation and secondly, what are the causes of the spread of the crisis and the success of these annexations? In response to this hypothesis, the reason for Russia's decision to attack Ukraine and annex these areas to Russia was to eliminate the threats caused by Ukraine's possible membership in NATO, also, the changes in the common values and norms between Ukraine and Russia during the crisis and commonalities and links between the Russian society and the societies of these regions have played an important role in the spread of the crisis and the success of annexations.To answer the research questions, the method of multiple case study and theories of balance of threat and constructivism have been used. The data was also collected in a library method and analyzed with a descriptive-analytical approach. The findings of the article shows that both material and immaterial factors played a role in Russia's military attack on Ukraine and the annexation of these areas to the Russian Federation.

Abstract With Putin's reelection on March 2018, a new era of relations started between Russia and the West. During the period of Putin's presence in the Kremlin, relations between West and Russia have experienced some periods of tension and peaceful concords. In early 1990s, there were prospects about Russia’s becoming a democratic state and becoming part of the normative framework of the West. After the end of the Cold War, Russia sought an equal status in international system and it also was against Western values and normative imposition. The main question of the article is "how the areas of disagreement between the Russian Federation and the West can be assessed?" The author believes that there has been a divergence between Russia and the West’s attitude towards the international system after the end of the Cold War. Russia tries to stabilize its position as a global power ​​and the rejects the existence of its specific spheres of influence that is claimed by the West.

Abstract Although the Ukrainian crisis was accompanied by tensions between Russia and the West and the imposition of mutual sanctions, demonstration of military power and diplomatic conflicts, it did not have a great impact on the Russian Federation's policies in the Arctic and its militarism in that region. At the same time, Moscow has managed to continue its cooperation in the Arctic despite current tensions with the West, and to extend its relations with other regional actors in a cooperative manner. The author attempts to find an answer for the following questions: a) Why Russia, in spite of its rivalry with the United States and the West, has not behaved contentiously in the arctic; b) why Ukraine's experience does not seem to happen in the Arctic? To answer the mentioned questions, the hypothesis has been tested through examining the two theoretical approaches of "complex interdependence" and "neo-realism" confirming that "the superiority of Russia's position in the Arctic and the lack of a serious threat to its interests in this area by the other powers has led Russia to play differently in the Arctic, in such a way that Moscow requires cooperation and, at least, avoids from tension in the region in order to gain its absolute interests. Therefore, the Ukrainian crisis has not had much influence on Moscow's understanding of the Arctic as an area of international cooperation and peace. The findings of this study, which are comparative and descriptive-analytical, confirm the validity of the research hypothesis.

Abstract Since the end of cold war neither the Great Britain nor Russia has ever prioritized one another; and therefore their mutual relationship has been mainly confined to the framework of European Union and NATO. This has happened irrespective of their common history, including both countries’ presence in Security Council, their actorness as great powers and coalition in some international crises including their cooperation in Napoleonian War and strategic cooperation in World War II. The Great Britain and Russia’s envision about each other is formed in a framework of rivalry and bellicosity. Brexit has also been one of the challenges in their relations; still their diplomatic relationship in at its lowest level since the end of cold war. The author attempts to answer the following question: How are the effective factors on Britain and Russia’s disagreement assessed? The author argues that their different prism for seeing the international order after cold war, Russia’s hybrid war in Great Britain and its attempt to manipulate in 2016 survey, Ukraine’s crisis and Crimea’s accession to Russia, the murder of some Russian citizens in Britain as well as their divergent approach towards the Syrian crisis, have all led to a threat perception from one another and a reduction in mutual relations. Using explanatory – analytical research method, the author attempts to find an answer for the article’s question.

Abstract The crisis of Ukraine although derived from some regional roots, has involved the trans-regional powers in the events of Russian borders. As a regional power, Russia wants to protect and enhance its role in the former Soviet Union realm, but this aim is opposed and resisted by some actors such as Ukraine. On the other perspective we are witnessing that the west could not interfere in the region and could not challenge the role of Russia without national and regional backgrounds. However, the reaction of the west to the Russian actions in Ukraine has imposed some costs on Moscow. With continuing instability in Ukraine, Moscow pursues bargaining with the west and emphasizes on its important role in other crisis regions. This article addresses the question that whether the current tension between Russia and the west would lead to an international confrontation or would the crisis of Ukraine lead to a trans-regional crisis? This article argues that in spite of trans-regional consequences of disagreement on Ukraine, the Ukrainian crisis is essentially a regional issue and that the dimensions of this crisis are regionally manageable. Furthermore in spite of clash of interests between Russia and the west over Ukraine because of Russia's need to west for establishing the conditions of revitalizing its great power position and thanks to pragmatism of Moscow, a longstanding tension and a new cold war between Russia and the west can be prevented and the conversion of a regional crisis to a trans-regional conflict can be avoided.