‍Central Asia and The Caucasus Journal

Abstract Due to the extremely indiscrete nature of the aquatic structures and the complicated and manipulated hydropolitics of Central Asia, the water, energy and food security in every country in the region is potentially affected by even a slight change in the water politics of each of the five states. Accordingly, Central Asia, or at least every set of states situated at two drainage basins of Amu Darya and Syr Darya, could be considered as a hydropolitical security complex. This study analyzes and evaluates Turkmenistan’s policy on water resources within the Amu Darya hydropolitical security complex, with an emphasis on the use of extraterritorial surface runoff. The question is “what do Turkmenistan’s water problems arise from and what is the practical way to overcome them?” In response, the hypothesis that was tested is that “the water problems in Turkmenistan are caused by growing demands for irrigation in that country that are the result of three factors: rapid population growth, non-optimal irrigation methods, and the climate change. A plan to optimize the water consumption and develop a multilateral mechanism for fair allocation of water with the purpose of ensuring water-energy security in all countries located in the Amu Darya hydropolitical security complex would address the water problems to a large extent.” This article is based on qualitative method (descriptive-analytical research) and has used inductive methodology. The descriptive statistics and the findings based on this method have been analyzed in the light of the concept of water security and the hydropolitical security complex hypothesis. An analysis of the findings of the article confirm the abovementioned hypothesis to some extent, suggesting that Turkmenistan and other downstream countries have no choice but to “abandon the option for cash crop farming and focus on substitute plans to generate profit and provide employment for the rural population” or to “follow a pattern similar to the water-energy barter system under the Soviet Union”.

Abstract Japan’s Silk Road Diplomacy, introduced in 1997, is considered as the first formal and obvious use of the Silk Road metaphor by a Post-Soviet States in order for engaging with Central Asian societies. Although the narrative discourse of Japan's Silk Road diplomacy could contribute to the prompt development of Tokyo’s diplomacy in Central Asia, it has stagnated -but not declined- since reaching its peak in 2006. This paper is aimed to explore the evolutionary process of the narration of Japan’s Silk Road policy in Central Asia and its relationship with the Silk Road Economic Belt (the continental part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative). The question addressed here is: “What rule governs the Japan-China Silk Road game in Central Asia, and why?” The initial response is that “Since japan has shifted its security and infrastructural priorities toward South and Southeast Asia and due to the existence of geopolitical bottlenecks in connecting this country to Central Asia, Tokyo's approach to the Silk Road Economic Belt is gradually changed from non-participation to conditional interaction in a non-zero-sum game”. The findings of this paper, fulfilled through applying an inductive reasoning method and modifying the above hypothesis, show that the interaction between the Silk Road narrations of Japan and China in Central Asia has never been hostile and has fluctuated between minimal participation and conditional/multilateral interaction. However, the conflict between the two mentioned different discourses based on the result of the zero-sum game in Indo-Pacific has moved towards China's Maritime Silk Road Initiative and Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative.

Abstract A rise in the number of the Caspian Sea littoral states after dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the 20th century and the significance of those areas due to the decline of the United States’ hegemony in the international system at the beginning of the 21st century have set the stage for the emergence of a new region called the Caspian Sea region. The Caspian Sea region is comprised of five littoral states, including a big power, a regional power, and three local powers. Considering that the region is situated in a zone where Asia connects Europe and which holds abundant resources, it has attracted the attention of trans-regional actors. Such growing attention may drive the future of the region into chaotic situation. This study seeks to find an answer to the basic question that “how is it possible to define the agenda for convergence in the Caspian Sea region?” To answer this question, a mixed research method -- two-stage exploratory research method -- was employed. In the first stage, library resources were used to assess the mutual security dependencies of the Caspian Sea regional states which would affect the process of convergence in the military, political, economic, social and environmental spheres. In the next stage, the extracted data was used to prepare the tools for a questionnaire, which was completed by a group of 24 people familiar with the regional issues. Ultimately, a quantitative analysis of the questionnaires have been conducted to separate the low politics from the high politics and propose an agenda of convergence in the Caspian Sea region.

Abstract Central Asia is of great significance for Iran in terms of geopolitical and geostrategic links. In the meanwhile, China and Russia have also paid more attention to Central Asia in recent years and have put forward many initiatives to extend their influence and assert their superiority. This article studies the dimensions and features of Sino-Russian axis in Central Asia and the opportunities that the strategies of the two countries in this region would provide for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Based on the descriptive-analytical research method, the article looks for an appropriate answer to the question on how the Islamic Republic of Iran can get closer to the fulfillment of its interests in that region amid the regional purposes of Moscow and Beijing in Central Asia. The hypothesis is that “China and Russia’s mutual concerns about the security, economic and institutional interests have forced the two countries to adopt coordinated policies. This would bring about regional balance, as the Islamic Republic of Iran can adopt a defensive participation approach in such circumstance to get closer to the fulfillment of its economic and security interests in the region.” The theoretical pillars of the article are based upon the theories of defensive and offensive (structural) realists, and the findings are the result of data gathered from the libraries, documents, sources in the virtual space, and the statistics and figures.

Abstract Russia’s extensive diplomatic efforts to govern and make the virtual space regulations, referred to as cyber diplomacy, have passed three stages of development so far. At first, the purpose of Russian cyber diplomacy was restricted to the prevention of militarization in the cyberspace, but the extending scope of the cyber and information wars made Russia enter the stage of convincing the governments to accept a series of rules governing the activities of states in the cyberspace. Russia further launched efforts to sign bilateral agreements with a number of Western states in order to ban the military use of information and communications technology against each other. This study examines the initiatives, priorities, motives, and consequences of Russia’s cyber diplomacy at the international, regional and bilateral levels and looks for an answer to the key question of “what is the intellectual origin of Russian cyber diplomacy and what purpose does it pursue?” According to the findings of the study, Russia’s cyber diplomacy is rooted in its comprehension of cyberspace as a new instrument for Western hegemony. Moscow’s ultimate purpose of making diplomatic efforts in the cyberspace is to end the regulatory authority of the entities advocating Washington, Brussels and NATO over the cyberspace and establish a global governance of the virtual space. The article is based on qualitative method (descriptive-analytical research) and has used inductive methodology. The descriptive statistics and the findings have been analyzed in the light of the concept of virtual space governance and the uncertain and fluid nature of this concept.

Abstract The structure of the current international system results from dissolution of the Soviet Union and termination of bipolar order. The main feature of this system is uneven distribution of power. Such structure, known as unipolar order, has increased the competition among the international system’s main actors for filling the power vacuum. Some believe that such tensions could prepare the ground for the international system’s transition to multipolar order. The reasoning behind the conclusion is weakness of the United States of America, emergence of new powers, and formation of new poles within the framework of regional initiatives. The latest example of such bloc of non-Western powers is the Greater Eurasia plan, pursued by Russia after the Ukraine crisis. The idea of “Great Eurasia” refers to an area stretching from Lisbon to Shanghai. However, this is a geopolitical innovation, political slogan, economic ambition, and ideological structure. Most importantly, it seeks to create a modern and post-American order with Russia playing the vital role. Considering that issue, the main question of the article is “what role and function could the regional initiatives, such as the Greater Eurasia, play in the current international system’s transition to multipolar order?” The authors believe that considering the power imbalance in the international system and the constant efforts by the actors to make up for it, the regional initiatives are an innovative instrument for decentralization of power in the international system and perform two main functions. Firstly, they prevent direct confrontation between the main actors of the international system (Sino-Russian cooperation under this initiative to avert direct confrontation with the US), and, secondly, they help formation of multipolar order by presenting substitute regulations (Russian efforts to change norms of liberal order). Due to the complexities of relations between the actors in such sets, the pace of transition would be slow, but, if materialized, they could have a leading role in the creation of a perfect multipolar order in the long term. The article is based on descriptive-analytical research method.